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COVID-19 Policy Responses: Reflections on Governmental Financial Resilience in 
South Asia 
Purpose: First, the paper examines the short-term fiscal and budgetary responses of the 
South Asian governments to the COVID-19 pandemic. Next, it brings out the 
implications of such responses, focusing on India, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
Design/methodology/approach: The paper is based on multiple secondary data sources, 
including the viewpoints of experts and government officials. Data are analysed using the 
ideas of financial resilience. 
Findings: South Asian governments’ response to the pandemic shows a gap in 
understanding the magnitude of the problem and in developing financial resilience. This 
paper points out the importance of avoiding austerity, becoming more cautious in 
accepting lending conditions, rethinking public sector accountability and revitalising 
mutual collaboration through SAARC1 for developing financial resilience, both at 
individual country and regional levels.
Originality/value: The study offers some insights on policy implications for South Asian 
governments in terms of building financial resilience to deal with future crises. 
Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic, budgetary response, financial resilience, South Asian 
countries.
1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has already proved to be the worst humanitarian crisis the 
world has faced since the Second World War and economic crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (ILO, 2020; Gopinath, 2020). The pandemic has so far claimed 
over a million lives across countries (see, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu), tens of millions of 
jobs have been lost and Europe is bracing for a second wave of the virus, whereas some 
countries have yet to reach the peak (as of 30 September 2020). With a decade of 
austerity and the unprecedented encroachment of neoliberalism, even developed 
1 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985 with the objective
of promoting and improving the welfare and quality of life of the peoples of South Asia, which comprises 
eight member countries - Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
(https://saarc-sec.org/)

































































countries, Australia (Andrew et al., 2020) and the UK (Ahrens and Ferry, 2020; Heald 
and Hodges, 2020) being examples, appear to be not fully prepared in handling the health 
and socio-economic consequences of the pandemic. In this regard, it is worth examining 
how some of the poorest countries in the world are managing the current situation given 
existing fiscal challenges. The pandemic is expected to push 400 million informal 
workers into extreme poverty and its economic fallout could increase global poverty by 
half a billion people (ILO, 2020). Mahler et al. (2020) state that out of the total number of 
people expected to fall into poverty, two-thirds of them would be South Asians (SA). 
South Asia, home to nearly a quarter of the world's population, is likely to experience its 
worst economic performance in the last 40 years (World Bank, 2020b; ADB, 2020). 
The impact of COVID-19 in SA countries appears significant in people’s life and 
livelihoods. More than 7.02 million people are infected with the virus and so far, 111,191 
people have lost their lives (Table 1). The poor and vulnerable communities in the region 
are likely to be more affected, given the collapse of the informal sector which accounts 
for more than 2 billion people globally, with most of the workforce in emerging 
economies, not least in SA (ILO, 2020). As in the case of other emerging economies (see 
e.g. Ejiogu et al., 2020), SA countries are also focused on mitigating the immediate 
effects of the pandemic with short-term stimulus packages. However, the majority of 
these countries lifted lockdown restrictions when both infection and death rates were on a 
rising trajectory (World Bank, 2020b; BBC, 2020). The financial resilience of SA 
governments in terms of protecting life and safeguarding livelihoods has therefore raised 
concerns. Similarly, the challenging budgetary position of these governments questions 
the extent to which their stimulus packages, developed with little preparation and long-
term planning, are adequate to address the magnitude of the crisis.
Drawing on the notion of ‘financial resilience’ (Barbera et al., 2017, 2020), our objective 
in this paper is two-fold. First, we examine the short-term fiscal and budgetary responses 
of SA governments to the COVID-19 pandemic and shed light on the regional appro ch 
that the countries have agreed on to mitigate the consequences collectively. Second, we 
bring out the views expressed by experts and government officials in three SA countries - 

































































India, Nepal and Sri Lanka – with regard to the implications of such responses. These 
three countries are chosen because of their diverse picture in terms of COVID cases and 
mortality rates. For instance, Sri Lanka is well known for its health system and far ahead 
in COVID management than other countries in the region. The situation is different in 
India and Nepal, as they are connected, and shows an alarming trend in number of cases 
and mortality rates. In particular, Nepal is a land locked country. We believe the findings 
generated from our analysis could justify the need for coordinated regional approaches in 
SA to build a collective strategy for financial resilience to external shocks, i.e. the 
pandemic. 
Secondary sources we used to collect data for this paper include: news(paper) 
portals/articles and government websites of SA countries, including  central banks;  
information and reports published by international agencies such as the World Bank 
(WB), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Unite Nations (UN), the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and the 
viewpoints of experts and government officials in India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, as covered 
in the media. 
2. Governmental Financial Resilience
Prior work in management and other disciplines demonstrates the multifaceted nature of 
resilience, where the term has been used to study how a system responds to particular 
shocks, disturbances and perturbations, recovers from crises and adapts to new 
circumstances (Linnenluecke, 2017; Barbera et al., 2020). Beyond the reactive responses 
to crisis management, the resilience perspective also investigates proactive measures, 
such as situation awareness, forecasting potential risks and managing key vulnerabilities 
(Boin and Lodge, 2016; Steccolini et al., 2017). 
Public sector accounting researchers have started using the notion of resilience mainly to 
shed light on different aspects of governments’ austerity and budget cut management 
(Cepiku et al., 2015). The application of the resilience perspective has enabled these 

































































researchers not only to capture processes underlying governmental responses to crises, 
for instance ‘bouncing back’ and ‘bouncing forward’ (Ahrens and Ferry, 2020), but also 
to demonstrate the interaction of external and internal factors and its implication in 
dealing with financial shocks and shaping vulnerabilities (Barbera et al., 2017; 2020). For 
instance, Barbera et al. (2017) have applied financial ‘resilience’ to explore governments’ 
abilities to anticipate, absorb and react to shocks and crises in the context of the local 
governments of Austria, Italy and England. The study argues that limited awareness of 
what anticipatory and coping capacities are required in order to anticipate, absorb and 
react to shocks undermines governmental financial resilience. In a similar vein, in their 
study of Italian municipalities, Barbera et al. (2020) show the importance of anticipatory 
and coping capacities in responding to shocks affecting public finances, although a 
variation in their combination through accounting may result in different responses to 
shocks. 
Rarely have any attempts been made in prior work to unfold governmental financial 
resilience in emerging economy contexts, except for de Aquino and Cardoso’s (2017) 
work on Brazil and Klimanov et al.’s (2020) work on Russia. The former investigates the 
financial resilience patterns of four Brazilian municipalities in an unexpected revenue 
downturn, whereas the latter examines the resilience of Russia’s regions facing the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic provides an interesting context to explore how 
national governments across the globe have reacted to financial emergencies resulting 
from the unexpected healthcare crisis, and what financial resilience strategies have been 
adopted in restoring the economy and peoples’ livelihoods. For instance, in their study of 
UK local governments, Ahrens and Ferry (2020) have argued that inadequate central 
government support in the aftermath of COVID 19 is likely to further weaken the 
financial resilience of local authorities and adversely affect the economic growth and 
social response of the entire country. We extend prior work on governmental financial 
resilience through examining the fiscal and budgetary measures adopted by the SA 
central governments during the pandemic and analysing how the financial resilience of 
these countries could be strengthened in the longer-term.  

































































What we find interesting in the context of SA is that the budgetary and fiscal positions of 
several SA governments were already fragile; some were even under the IMF and the 
WB’s scrutiny due to unsustainable external debts. As depicted in Table 1, while Bhutan 
(102.38%) records the highest debt in the region, Sri Lanka (83.28%), Pakistan (71.69%) 
and Maldives (68.03%) have more than half of their GDP equivalent to government debt. 
Fitch Ratings (2020) forecasts that all SA countries will significantly increase their 
general government (GG) debt to GDP ratio after COVID-19. Sri Lanka’s debt ratio is 
expected to continuously increase up to 97.3% throughout 2020-2022. Both Pakistan and 
India’s GG to GDP ratios are predicted to stabilise until 2022. Obviously, these high-debt 
situations have become a major impediment in developing adequate and effective 
responses to COVID-19. It is expected that government debt refinancing mechanisms and 
continuing budget deficits will continue to limit the growth potential and put further 
challenges on financial resilience and stability. The forecast of SA’s regional growth 
predicts a fall to a range between 1.8 to 2.8% in 2020, down from 6.3% projected in 
November 2019, the region’s worst performance in the last 40 years (table 2) (World 
Bank, 2020b). It is estimated that the GDP of these countries would contract up to 2.7% 
in 2020. In fact, four countries in the region - Afghanistan, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka - are expected to experience negative growth with severe financial difficulties. 
---------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 1 
---------------------------------------------
3. Response to the Pandemic: An Overview of Short-term Financial Resilience  
Initial impacts of the pandemic in the region were travel disruptio s, supply chain 
constraints and the outflows of international capital. Industrial and services activities 
have sharply fallen across the countries because of the strict restrictions imposed by 
central and local governments, including border closures, prohibition on mass gatherings, 
social distancing, suspension of non-essential activities/services, SMEs and educational 
institutions, and a city/nationwide lockdown. For instance, in India, the fragility of its 
labour market is evident through the disturbing images of nearly ten million migrant 

































































labourers returning to their villages hundreds of miles away, and half a million of them 
walking or bicycling (Kugler and Sinha, 2020). The tourism industry has been severely 
damaged by the pandemic in countries such as the Maldives - where the industry 
contributes almost 65% to total GDP- Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka (World Bank, 
2020b). Remittances, both internal and external, which have been an important source of 
income for large numbers of households, have been hit hard, not to mention the severe 
impact on the garment industry of Bangladesh and India's steel exports.
At the regional level, the leaders of SAARC countries have made a commitment to work 
collectively to prevent the spread of COVID-19. They have agreed to establish a COVID-
19 emergency fund (CEF) with a provision of voluntary contributions from all SA 
countries to strengthen their financial resilience. India alone has pledged US$ 10 million 
as an initial contribution to the CEF. This CEF is particularly important, as all SA 
countries have similar short-term spending priorities, focusing on cash transfers to 
vulnerable and lower-income households, sourcing health facilities (e.g. testing 
machines, PPE, ICU beds and ventilators), concessional loans and food allowances for 
low-income families. As of 14 July 2020, the CEF consists of an accumulated sum of 
$21.8 million (see, https://saarc-sec.org/). However, political differences amongst the 
countries have limited the extension of such collective and regional approaches to 
responding to the pandemic. 
At the individual country level, each country’s immediate budgetary responses to 
COVID-19 have targeted poor and vulnerable populations, mainly migrants and informal 




Overall, the stimulus packages in the region may appear to be too little when compared 
with those of western governments. Most features forbearance of taxes, rents, interests 

































































and utility payments and extended deadlines with loan payments. In addition, all the 
countries have set up separate COVID-19 emergency funds, mobilising both local and 
international sources. In particular, most of the countries have sourced from the WB 
Group’s emergency fast track coronavirus support for developing countries2, EU 
COVID-19 solidarity grants (Sri Lanka EUR 22mn), IMF Rapid Credit Facility 
(Bangladesh $224mn; Maldives $28.9mn; Nepal $214mn), IMF Rapid Financing 
Instrument (Bangladesh $488mn), ADB COVID-19 relief  $3mn grants and the ADB 
COVID-19 loan facilities (Bangladesh $500mn), and international commercial loans 
(e.g., Sri Lanka obtained $500mn from China Development Bank) (Embassy of China in 
Sri Lanka, 2020). All these initiatives and borrowings signal a challenge for SA 
governments in the medium and longer term to reduce public spending and maintain their 
sovereign debt, calling for them to pursue a strategy for building fiscal resilience.  
4. Implications of National Level Fiscal Responses: Building Financial Resilience 
This section discusses the implications of fiscal and budgetary responses imposed by 
India, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
4.1 India’s response to COVID 19 
The Indian economy was experiencing a slowdown even prior to the pandemic. GDP 
growth fell continuously for a few quarters and had fallen to just 3.1% in March 2020 
(Hindustan Times, 2020). Recently, the IMF has further cut India’s growth forecast for 
2020-21 to 1.9%, a worrying deceleration phase for India’s economy which was growing 
at 8.2% in March 2018. Irrespective of this, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India 
seems to be confident about the financial resiliency of the country in managing the 
pandemic based on an improved debt to GDP ratio, managed fiscal deficit and a well-
controlled inflation and current account. For instance, the Governor stated: “In several 
2 Afghanistan - $100.4mn; Bangladesh - $100mn; Bhutan – $5mn, India - $1bn, Maldives - $7mn, Nepal – 
29mn, Pakistan - $200mn and Sri Lanka $128.6mn.

































































aspects, the Indian economy and financial sector this time around was far more resilient 
than what it was during the global financial crisis” (Reuters, 2020).
However, the Ministry of Finance’s report (https://dea.gov.in/external-debt) reveals a 
somewhat different picture based on the external debt which has increased by 2.8% to 
US$558.5 billion in March 2020, mainly due to the rise in commercial borrowings.  The 
external debt to GDP ratio now stands at 20.6% compared with 19.8% last year. The 
Indian economy has contracted by 23.9% (year-on-year) in the quarter ending in June 
2020 (www.imf.org).
India’s stimulus package comprises more than $260 billion (which accounts for around 
10% of the GDP) (Gettleman and Kumar, 2020). Tax relief measures were central to the 
package, which included, amongst others, the deferral of income tax, GST filing and 
other compliance deadlines, a redu tion of interest for tax payments and the waiving of 
late filing penalties (see, https://home.kpmg/), in addition to support measures for the 
business and agriculture sectors. The package provided eases business processes and 
structural reforms. Although many of these measures are restatements of existing 
schemes, it provides a platform for further growth in many sectors. However, the package 
appears to be too little to the country’s poor and the informal economy which 90% of 
India’s 1.3 billion population (ILO, 2020) depends on. For instance, the resources 
allocated for ‘free food and cash transfers’ were just 1% of GDP, whereas countries such 
as Singapore and the US spent about 10% of GDP on similar packages. Economists have 
therefore raised concerns over the efficacy of the stimulus package. For instance, Shilan 
Shan, who work as capital economist, stated: “The actual measures to boost demand are 
very, very small. It’s not going to do enough to prevent a very, very sharp contraction in 
growth”, while development economist Reetika Khera stated that “… there is almost zero 
by way of relief” (Financial Times, 2020).
4.2. Nepal’s response to COVID-19
The ILO (2020) estimates that between 1.6 to 2 million jobs in the informal sectors, 
which represent almost 80% of the total workforce, can be affected by the current crisis.       

































































Informal workers, especially in the hospitality, retail trade and transport sectors are more 
likely to be severely affected as per the World Bank (2020b) report. In a recent survey 
report, the UNDP (2020, p. 15) states that “three in five employees have lost their jobs in 
the micro and small businesses”. The tourism industry, which contributes to almost 8% 
of the country’s GDP, witnessed a sharp drop of 73% in tourist arrivals during March 
2020 (UNDP, 2020). Remittances make up almost 25% of Nepal’s GDP and both 
migration and flows of remittances to the country have been hit hard by the pandemic 
(World Bank, 2020b; ILO, 2020). A large number of Nepalese migrant workers face 
unemployment in the destination countries such as India, Malaysia and Middle East, 
thereby pushed to the brink of absolute poverty.
The Ministry of Finance announced its first relief package3 on 31 March 2020, claiming 
it an effective response which could protect the livelihoods of the poor, businesses and 
the economy of the country. The package included several provisions, for instance  
providing food rations to the most vulnerable people; subsidising utility bills; extending 
tax filing deadlines; extending contributions to the social security scheme; setting up 
quarantine centres for and temporary hospitals returnees migrants; and offering additional 
insurance to the medical staff dealing with COVID19 (https://mof.gov.np/). On 28 May, 
the then Finance Minister, Dr. Yuba Raj Khatiwada, presented the 2020/21 budget, 
outlining additional measures to prevent people falling into poverty and revitalise the 
economy. Measures included an increased budget for the health sector including building 
new hospitals, funding for food relief, direct wage support to workers affected by the 
coronavirus, financial support to creating jobs and business support (see, www.imf.org). 
During his speech, the Minister stated that he had prepared the budget “… with the 
confidence that we can and we will rise soon again on the basis of resilience we had in 
the face of disasters…”,  presenting one of the budget objectives  as “building resilient … 
and prosperous economy though social, economic and physical infrastructure 
development” (Budget FY2020/21, pp. 1-5). 
3 Government of Nepal: Ministry of Finance (2020, March 31), Press release 2076-12-28. Retrieved from 
https://mof.gov.np/

































































However, not only is  the package perceived to be too little to deal with the pandemic, the 
crisis has, as stated by Gill and Sapkota (2020), brought to the fore and further 
exacerbated the country’s long standing weaknesses such as corruption, poor service 
delivery and a failure to create employment opportunities for millions of citizens. There 
has been widespread criticism of the government’s handling of the pandemic, with  
thousands of young people protesting taking to  the streets during lockdown in  
Kathmandu and other parts of the country in June, demanding  better management of the 
pandemic and financial transparency in the purchase of medical supplies (Dhungana, 
2020).
4.3. Sri Lanka’s response to COVID 19
Among the SA countries, Sri Lanka’s efforts have been apparently successful in terms of 
preventing the spread of the virus and minimising the death toll. However, the pandemic 
has further weakened the country's already fragile and debt-ridden economy, adding 
further distress and exacerbating the financial resilience. The government’s immediate 
approach was to borrow money from external sources, even increasing the excessive 
amount of existing external debts. International media reported how the government had 
sought all possible means of sourcing funds in responding to the pandemic. 
“With the pandemic that hit Sri Lanka in March amplifying the economic crisis 
manyfold, the country’s looming debt crunch gave the government the jitters. The 
government went for new loans to service past borrowings, including over $5 
billion from China and $960 million from India. In March, Sri Lanka signed an 
agreement with China for another $500 million loan after an “urgent request” 
from Colombo, to deal with the pandemic’s harsh economic blow.” (The Hindu, 
22 August 2020).
With the continuous increase of external borrowing, financial experts and borrowing 
agencies expressed concerns about the country’s re-payment capacity with further 
increases of external debts during the pandemic: 
External debt payments between now and December amount to $3.2 billion. Other 
costs could bring that up to $6.5 billion in the next 12 months, Morgan Stanley 
estimates, and with FX reserves of just $7.2 billion, it has described the situation as 
a ‘tightrope walk’. The crunch point looks likely to be a $1 billion international 
sovereign bond payment due in October (Reuters, 27 May 2020).

































































In addition to external borrowings, the government established the ‘COVID-19 
Healthcare and Social Security Fund’, sourced from tax free local and foreign donations 
(Rs. 902 million as of July 2020). 
The Sri Lankan government has implemented several important budgetary and fiscal 
measures, allocating 0.1% of the GDP for quarantine and containment procedures, in 
support of the victims. Tax exemptions, price ceilings on essential food items, 
concessional loans, various food allowances, interest reduction, import restriction and 
loan deferral are some important measures executed by the government in response to the 
crisis. Further, Rs. 50 billion (around 0.33% of the GDP) has been distributed to the 
vulnerable groups in the form of direct cash payment (Rs. 5,000 per family per month) 
(United Nations - Sri Lanka, 2020). Rs 500 million has been allocated to the COVID-19 
eradication programme as part of stretching the healthcare facilities in the country.  The 
poorest community - 2 million Samurdhi - received Rs. 20 billion advance payment 
(United Nations - Sri Lanka, 2020). With the aim of restricting capital outflows during 
this period (e.g. suspending outward investments), the government suspended private 
commercial banks to purchase government sovereign bonds. The government’s ability to 
sustain such measures is however questioned, given the country’s precarious economic 
condition and limited financial resilience.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The impact of the pandemic has been unprecedented in SA. The collapse of informal and 
service sectors employing a vast majority of low-income and informal workers, and 
further decline in remittances, have brought to the fore the deeply embedded social and 
wealth inequalities in SA. In terms of responses to the external shock created by COVID-
19, SA governments in general and India, Nepal and Sri Lanka in particular, have 
demonstrated the characteristics of ‘reactive adapters’ in financial resilience (Barbera et 
al., 2017, 2020). The crisis has prompted the region to follow a ‘reorientation path’ to 
strengthen their capacities through short-term fiscal and budgetary responses.

































































SA governments’ response to the pandemic shows a gap in terms of understanding the 
magnitude of the problem and developing financial resilience. For instance, the pre-
COVID economic slowdown of India and rising debts of other countries challenged both 
anticipatory and coping capacities (Barbera et al., 2017, 2020) to propose sustainable 
stimulus packages that could address the longer-term economic consequences of the 
pandemic and develop governmental financial resilience. Two issues are worth 
highlighting in revitalising the financial resilience of the region. First, it is paramount for 
governments to avoid austerity and cutback management in the longer term. Prior work 
shows the impact of austerity programmes that governments in the West have adopted to 
maintain control of sovereign debts and deficits in the aftermath of financial crises 
(Bracci et al., 2015). For instance, in the case of the UK, it is argued that austerity has 
impacted child poverty, increased the demand for food banks, slowed down affordable 
housing programmes and reduced local authority spending on public services (Hyndman 
and McKillop, 2019; Heald and Hodges, 2020). Next, as our findings reveal, increased 
levels of borrowing is a  trend in most  SA countries who  are therefore required to be 
reflective in accepting the lending conditions of international organisations, which often 
come  with neo-liberal New Public Management reforms, and in structuring stimulus 
packages. In fact, market-led neo liberal reforms have undermined social services, safety 
nets and the provision of social goods and limited the government’s capacity to deal with  
crises such as COVID-19, even in developed countries such as Australia (Andrew et al., 
2020), let alone SA countries. The devastating impacts of such reforms, privatisation 
serving as just one example, in extending income and wealth inequalities in the region, 
are discussed in previous studies (Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Adhikari et al., 2019).
As stated in prior work (Barbara et al., 2017, 2020), to build long-term governmental 
financial resilience requires governments to launch resilience-building processes 
enhancing their organisational – anticipatory and coping – capacities. For instance, 
governments may contemplate establishing mandatory reserves, pursuing policies of 
fiscal autonomy and facilitating revenue diversification. In this regard, countries such as 
South Korea and Estonia’s efforts to stretch their financial space also could be relevant. 
For instance, Raudla and Douglas (2020) state that Estonia was in a better position to 

































































respond to COVID-19 compared with the 2008 financial crisis, through having 
maintained financial discipline and public debt over the recent years. Kim (2020) 
mentions about South Korea’s strong short-term fiscal resilience resulted by the country’s 
effective debt management, although the future viability has raised concerns. The 
pandemic may provide an opportunity for SA countries to overhaul fiscal and budgetary 
policies to support the restart of their economies.
The country specificities in the relief packages shows the need for a diverse approach in 
the region. For instance, India's stimulus package needs to address long-term challenges 
in the labour market, possibly through enhancing the provisions on the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme for urban employment and further cash transfers (Kugler 
and Sinha, 2020). Both Nepal and Sri Lanka may need to focus on creating jobs by 
promoting specific sectors such as tourism, which can impact on other businesses such as 
hospitality, transportation, retail, trade and a number of other sectors. Similarly, 
contributions of remittance to GDP appear substantial (e.g., 25% in Nepal) in most SA   
countries, so governments should consider developing the competency of potential 
migrant workers who seek employment globally. However, such individual country 
efforts should be supplemented by forging collaboration between countries, as part of the 
strategy to develop the longer-term financial resilience of the region. For instance, 
membership of the European Union has enabled Estonia to facilitate negotiation with 
international investors for favourable borrowing rates and obtain favourable rating for its 
bond (Raudla and Douglas, 2020). SA governments need to develop a collaborative 
approach (SAARC) at the regional level, which would certainly put them in a stronger 
position to manage future pandemics, through developing financial resilience across the 
region. The newly established SAARC COVID forum could be transformed into an 
impactful responding mechanism at the regional level. Having such region l approaches 
would also help these countries to minimise their over-reliance on external commercial 
borrowing (specially Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Pakistan), and proceed with a multilateral 
approach in avoiding default after COVID-19. This would enable policy makers in the 
region to pay attention to ‘responsible borrowings’ and investments in key priority areas 
such as health care development. We therefore urged international organisations such as 

































































the WB, the IMF, the China Development Bank and the ABD to reconsider their lending 
conditions to SA countries, incorporating also a regional approach to lending and loan 
repayments, and foster collective efforts at the SAARC level in mitigating the impact of 
the pandemic and building up the financial resilience.
Lastly, a longer-term response to the pandemic may require a shift in the approach to 
public sector accountability in SA. The existing form of public sector accountability in 
SA has a relegated focus on non-financial aspects of performance such as equity, fairness 
and social impacts; this has, however, been the case in Western countries as well (Bracci 
et al., 2015; Grossi and Cepiku, 2014). International borrowing and ever-increasing debts 
and deficits have increased concerns over discharging transnational accountability, while 
marginalising the actual needs and requirements of the poor and vulnerable in the region. 
This is an important issue also for international organisations, despite being key resource 
providers to SA countries. The role they have played in emerging economies not least in 
SA, either in proposing public sector reforms or executing aid and loans, has often been 
questioned due to their increasing emphasis on the financial aspects of accountability 
(Ejiogu et al., 2020; Adhikari et al., 2019). Recent studies have discussed different forms 
of accountability, not least collaborative (Jayasinghe et al., 2020) and learning ones 
(Arun et al., 2020), in the region. The adoption of these newer perspectives may help SA 
countries to develop long-term financial resilience by forging wider partnerships with 
varied stakeholders and better respond to the consequences of the pandemic. Such a 
rethink in the discharging of public sector accountability may enable SA governments, as 
well as other emerging economies, to safeguard the jobs and livelihoods of their citizens. 
There is a need for governments, policymakers and international organisations to learn 
more on how public sector accountability could be reinvigorated in emerging economies 
to build a fairer and just post-COVID economy and society. Future studies could extend 
these perspectives, together with different approaches to financial resilience in SA 
countries and beyond, supported by primary data sources.
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Afghanistan 39,254 1,458 38 3 8.2 6.89 3.9 2.8 1.8
Bangladesh 362,043 5,219 163 5 2.8 31.75 7.95 5.8 4.1
Bhutan 281 0 0.8 6 3.6 102.38 17.4 4.2 18.5
India 6,225,763 97,497 1366.4 6 4.7 43.87 5.3 8.6 17.3
Maldives 10,194 34 0.5 4 13.7 68.03 43 45.6 64.3
Nepal 76,258 491 28.6 6 5.8 30.2 3 7.5 31.1
Pakistan 312,263 6,479 216.6 4 2.6 71.69 6.3 9.8 6.7
Sri Lanka 3,374 13 21.8 11 3.5 83.28 41.5 10 21.8
Total: 7,029,430 111,191 1835.7 6 NA NA NA NA NA
Sources: Websites of South Asian governments, the WHO (2020) and the World Bank
* Johns Hopkins University (https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region)
** International Monetary Fund (https://www.imf.org)
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Table 2. South Asia country forecasts
(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise) 
       Percentage point 
differences 
from January 2020 
projections
 2017 2018 2019e 2020f 2021f 2020f 2021f
Calendar year basis        
Afghanistan 2.7 1.8 2.9 -5.5 1.0 -8.5 -2.5
Maldives 6.8 6.9 5.2 -13.0 8.5 -18.5 2.9
Sri Lanka 3.6 3.3 2.3 -3.2 0.0 -6.5 -3.7
Fiscal year basis 16/17 17/18 18/19e 19/20f 20/21f 19/20f 20/21f
Bangladesh 7.3 7.9 8.2 1.6 1.0 -5.6 -6.3
Bhutan 6.3 3.8 3.9 1.5 1.8 -4.1 -5.8
India 8.3 7.0 6.1 4.2 -3.2 -0.8 -9.0
Nepal 8.2 6.7 7.0 1.8 2.1 -4.6 -4.4
Pakistan (factor cost) 5.2 5.5 1.9 -2.6 -0.2  -5.0 -3.2
Source: World Bank (2020a, p. 98)
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